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Landman et al.: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW.

By Edward H.

Rabin. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1974. Pp.
xvii, 1177. $18.50.

When asked recently by the United States Army Corps of Engineers to recommend a current and complete text on modem property
law, I suggested, without qualification, Rabin's Fundamentals of Modern Real Property Law.' The entire legal staff returned nothing but
raves, and now Rabin's text is kept on their desks as a reference book.
Recommending a basic property law text to a group of practicing
attorneys was a new experience for me. It was, however, simply an
expression of my enthusiasm and respect for Rabin's excellent work on
property law.
Professor Rabin knows how to write. It is such a pleasure to find
a legal educator who actually remembers how to write in English that
one is tempted to recommend his text on this basis alone. Ed Rabin
is more than an ordinary Professor of Law; Ed is a Professor on two
levels: first, he teaches students; second, and perhaps more importantly, he teaches teachers. His particular specialty happens to be
property law and for that property teachers can be grateful. Ed
has written a casebook entitled Fundamentals of Modern Real Property Law. This text is truly unique. This is not just another casebook. This book is a methodological device, which, when used
properly, allows each class to be more than just a Socratic drill, or a
lecture; it actually guides and stimulates each class hour into a "happening." For the purposes of this review, I will deal first with its content
and second with its methodology.

I.

CONTENT

Every law professor knows it is impossible to teach the subject of property in the first year property course. Twenty-five years
1. E. H. RABn, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW (1974).
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ago, Casner and Leach2 took over the property casebook field. How
easily we forget that their casebook represented a revolutionary
departure from the traditional property casebook.8 Actually, until
1950, property was taught in many law schools on a three year plan. 4
Today, the course description on property covers such subjects as
the governmental role in controlling real estate development (including
zoning, subdivision control, housing and building codes, environmental
law, planning, eminent domain, and urban renewal) and involves fields
of study so vast that treatises have been written on most of these subjects, yet all of them may be classified under the property heading.
Conveyancing has been the subject of separate courses as have the
doctrines peculiar to personal property. Estate planning alone (with
its many subsidiary subjects including wills, trusts, future interests, and
estate and gift taxation) requires more time than is usually available
for the entire basic property course-yet it is only a part of the subject
of property. Land finance and mortgages, real estate taxation, landlord
and tenant-the list is endless. A first year property casebook must,
unavoidably, be selective.
Most of the existing casebooks seem to have been designed for
use in a 90-hour course-three hours per week for two semesters. Yet
most property teachers find it difficult to complete satisfactorily many
of the existing casebooks in this period of time. Thus an attempt to
solve the problem of selectivity by simply making a bigger casebook is
doomed to failure. The casebooks may get bigger, but the available
course hours seem to stay the same or even contract. Of course it is always possible (and usually necessary) for the property teacher to edit
the casebook she or he uses by omitting selected cases or even whole
sections. Indeed the editors of the casebooks themselves often suggest
that this should be done-but the job is difficult and unrewarding. If
the students are directed to omit a few pages here and a case there, the
course runs the risk of becoming choppy and disjointed. But if whole
sections are skipped, or if the "back of the book" is never reached, students feel cheated of "essential" subject matter (if it was in the book it
must have been important!) and resent paying for a whole book but
only gaining the benefit of part of it. Thus, in my opinion, the "fat"
2. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TExr ON PROPERTY (1st std. ed. 1950).
3. For an excellent overview of the history of property texts see Berger, Book
Review, 84 HARv. L. REv. 267 (1970). See also Lazerow, Book Review, 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 162 (1971); Parella, Book Review, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 621 (1967).
4. Berger, Book Review, 84 HAIv. L. REv. 267, 269 (1970).
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property casebook, one which tries to cover everything in depth, is not
ideal.
Another solution to the problem of selectivity is simply to omit
land transfer and finance ("conveyancing") from the first year property
coursebook, or to give it only minimal treatment. But this solution rests
on the all too tempting assumption that students will take conveyancing
in their second or third year. To state the assumption is to refute it.
In my opinion, Professor Rabin's book successfully meets the challenge of selectivity. It is briefer than the others, and thus more easily
adapted to a course of less than 90 hours, and yet it contains ample
material for most 90-hour courses. Except for some material on fixtures, he avoids any treatment of personal property. I felt obliged to
supplement his book on real property with a series of lectures and readings on personal property. However, some of you may wish to reconsider whether the time traditionally devoted to personal property
subjects might be better spent on subjects of greater practical value. I
developed and used my own personal property materials starting with
Piersonv. Post,' as a cap to the last three weeks of the second semester.
In addition, as a useful and inexpensive textual supplement to
Rabin's book, some teachers may want to require students to purchase
the recently published paperback, Real Property in a Nutshell, by
Roger Bernhardt.6
The layout of Professor Rabin's book is very original. The book
is divided into 65 short chapters (or "assignments" as he calls them).
This simple device is extraordinarily helpful both to the teacher and the
student. If I could, I would make it compulsory for other authors to also
adopt this device. For the teacher it vastly simplifies the preparation of
the syllabus, whether or not the syllabus is handed out to the students.
Each assignment is a self-contained unit, and thus it is easy to designate
omissions and to regulate the pace of the class by covering the desired
number of assignments each week. Students also benefit from this
pedalogical device. It encourages, almost forces, the student to think
of all of the material in the assignment as a unit, and to compare and
contrast the cases with each other. This "comparing and contrasting,"
after all, is the real business of the classroom, and the topographical
arrangement of Rabin's book facilitates this.
The order of subjects in Rabin's book is an unusual one, but I
5. 3 Caines' R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
6. West Publishing Company, 1975.
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found it pedalogically effective. The first case in the book is State v.
Shack.' In a brilliant opinion, Chief Judge Weintraub affirms the right
of a farm worker residing in a migrant labor camp to receive visitors
without the permission of the employer-landlord. On the first day of
their study of property, the students read Judge Weintraub's wise judgment that "[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized
to that end, and are limited by it.' '8 May our property students and
lawyers ever remember this, their first and most important lesson in
property.
The introductory assignment is followed by some 180 pages dealing with non-freehold estates, and then only 158 pages dealing with
freehold estates. Traditionalists might be shocked by the brief treatment of future interests, and by the study of landlord-tenant problems
before the study of freehold estates. Yet in view of today's law school
curricula there is something to be said for this approach. All students
will probably be exposed to additional courses connected with estate
planning, in which their knowledge of future interests and related matters will be expanded. These later courses can usefully explore the
estates doctrines in depth, in the context in which the practicing lawyer
encounters them-the estate planning context. These concepts-the
doctrine of worthier title, the difference between a remainder and an
executionary interest, in my opinion, should not be extensively discussed in a casebook dealing with the modem law of real property.
Landlord-tenant law, on the other hand, is taught to most students only
in the first year property course. If it is not fully explored there, it
probably will not be fully explored anywhere. Thus, I think that Professor Rabin's decision to give more emphasis to non-freehold estates
and less emphasis to freehold estates than is customary is sound principle. Most teachers will find it desirable however, to supplement
Rabin's brief treatment of future interests with lectures or collateral assigned readings.
What of Professor Rabin's decision to treat leasehold estates before freehold estates? I have found this to be pedalogically successful.
The idea of divided ownership, of many interests in the same land, is
very difficult for beginning students to understand. They have had no
experience with it, or at least think that they have no experience with
it. By introducing the concept gradually, by means of a study of leasehold estates, the "cold-bath" effect of plunging directly into a study of
freehold estates is avoided.
7. 58 N.J. 297,277 A.2d 369 (1971).
8. 58 N.J. at -, 277 A.2d at 372 (emphasis added).
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After all, Professor Spies, when reviewing Browder, Cunningham
and Julin, in 1967, criticized these distinguished scholars for "immersing the student so quickly in the cold bath of hypertechnical property
lore" of estates.'
I personally have no criticism of Professor Rabin's book. In
addition, I have heard nothing but praise from my colleagues using his
text. The only slight concern I have heard expressed about the book
is its overreliance on California materials. But less than 15 percent
of the opinions in the casebook are from California courts, although
a slightly higher percentage of the text and other material is California
oriented. I use this as a takeoff point to bring in Oklahoma law and
the laws of other jurisdictions. Personally, I do not consider this concern of any consequence.
II.

METHODOLOGY

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Fundamentals of Modern
Real Property Law is its heavy reliance on the problem method. By
the use of the problem method, Professor Rabin does for law teaching
what Langdell did in his time with the introduction of the case method.
The typical assignment consists mainly of a problem and of cases or
other materials useful for the solution of the problem. I followed the
suggestion in the teachers manual and for each assignment I designated
a few students to be especially prepared. Each student takes the
position of plaintiff or defendant--one student acting as the judge.
These students are not to consult with each other during preparation.
They are also told to do additional research and to reach some firm
conclusions. Then the fun begins. The students are constantly surprised and shocked to learn that they frequently disagree with each
other-even after they have done extensive preparation and research.
Having invested a lot of time and ego in the development of a particular
viewpoint a student often holds to her or his views tenaciously, even
obstinately. The excitement is not necessarily over when I announce
my own opinion. The students, "with the greatest respect," often
question my own solution. This questioning, skeptical attitude, of
course, is what all law teachers want to develop, but it is also hard to
sustain.
I am convinced that the problem method used in Fundamentals
of Modern Real Property Law effectively encourages the students to
9. Spies, Book Review, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 233, 235 (1967) (emphasis added).
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think for themselves. I remember particularly one class session where
the student who was principally prepared announced to the class
in advance that he had "the case in point". (He told the class not to
prepare because he had all "the answers.") All went well for his presentation; however, at the end of his presentation, upon asking him if
that was all, I proceeded to explain that his "case in point" had been
reversed on appeal. It was a great lesson for the class, particularly
since this assignment in Rabin occurs just when the class has learned
to "Shepardize" a case. In addition, the student learned so well the
lesson of diligent preparation that he went on to make an "A" in the
course.
Obviously the problem method is ideal for stimulating class discussion. But the instructor should strenuously resist the temptation to sit
back and avoid lecturing. The problems and class discussion stimulate
and arouse the student's desire to learn. This desire must be satisfied by
presenting well-prepared lectures bringing together in coherent fashion
the major pertinent legal principles. If these augmenting lectures are
not presented, the students will become frustrated and eventually disinterested. The problem method does not reduce the need for lecturing; on the contrary, it highlights the confusion and ambiguities
inherent in most legal materials, and thus serves to sustain and heighten
the student's interest in the concepts and institutions that must be
mastered with the help of well-organized lectures before the legal
problems can be solved.
One word of caution in using the problem method. Should you
choose to teach by the problem method you open yourself up to a lot
of "shots" from students. A professor can hide her or his ignorance
behind a lecture, but with the problem method, you are constantly
interacting with your students. Some students will "bitch" the first six
weeks, particularly if there are several sections of property and you are
the only first-year teacher using this method. I sincerely urge you to
try it anyway. I assure you, you can handle the situation and the students. The detailed teacher's manual is a great help in this respect.
The level of class participation you will reach by about the sixth
week of school is worth the struggle.
IE.

CONCLUSION

Professor Spies commented on another casebook: "There is little
in this casebook that is novel or exciting, either in the materials or the
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way in which they are organized and presented."' 1
The exact reverse of this description would be realistic in assessing the value of Rabin's text. The entire approach of this casebook
is novel and exciting, both in regard to the materials and the way in
which they are organized and presented. For me, it goes one step
further; it is the book I would like to have written.
GeorginaB. Landman*

FIRE AND THE SPIIuTS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT. By
Rennard Strickland. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
1975. Pp. xx, 260. $9.95.

According to most early observers, the Cherokees had no system
of law. However, Professor Strickland points out in Fire and the Spirits
that "the Cherokee conception of law was simply different from the
more traditional Western idea of law."' Traditionally, Cherokee law
was founded on the spirit world as interpreted by a tribal orator (a
priest) during religious ceremonies.
The author reconstructs the traditional Cherokee legal system by
abstracting several social postulates in the manner of Hoebel,2 and by
analyzing the legal norms which existed among the Cherokees. According to Professor Strickland, the four levels of legal norms governed (1)
the relationships between man and the "Spirit Being," (2) conduct of
individuals toward the entire tribe, (3) clan rights and duties, and (4)
individual or personal matters.3 The author illustrates these norms
10. Id. at 234.
* Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, The University of Tulsa
College of Law; B.A., Trinity University; J.D., University of Denver; M.A., St. Louis
University; LL.M., University of Missouri-Kansas City; Member of the Oklahoma Bar.
1. R. STicELAND, FIRE AND THE SpnrrUs:
COURT 10 (1975).

CHEROKEE LAw FROM CLAN TO

2. E. A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRiMrnvE MAN: A STUDY rN COMPARATIVE LEGAL

DYNAMICS (1961).
3. R. STRICKLAND, FRE AND THE SPnUTS:
COURT 23 (1975).
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with several tables showing the spirit, community, clan, and individual4
deviations from the Cherokee law and the prescribed punishments..
The existence of two separate governmental structures-one for peacetime and another for wartime-is discussed in detail as another aspect
of the traditional Cherokee law ways. If the reader ever shared the
opinion of some early travelers that the Cherokees had a lawless
society, Fire and the Spirits quickly and convincingly dispels that
unsound notion.
Professor Strickland, a specialist in Indian legal history, traces the
development of the Cherokee legal system from one based on a divine
spirit order to one adopting those features of the Anglo-American law
compatible with tribal goals and values. He attributes the movement
from clan to court to such factors as
(1) a changing economic base, (2) a breakdown of the
traditional religious complex combined with increased missionary pressures, (3) discredit of conservative war leadership and withdrawal of traditional factions, (4) emergence
of a substantial class of mixed-breed Cherokees, and (5)
government policy combined with increased pressures for
lands and tribal dissolution.5
Each of these factors is examined in detail in light of its particular significance in contributing to the transition from clan to court.
A typical example of the secularization process during the eighteenth century is the change in the regulation of homicide. As a result
of this change, blood revenge, which had been the exclusive method
of regulating all homicides including accidental ones, was ultimately replaced by compensation in the form of cash or goods. 6
The adoption of a Cherokee constitution in 1827 was part of an
attempt by the Cherokees to "save their nation with the adoption of
'7
a new system of laws patterned after those of the white man."
Although to a large extent derived from the Constitution of the United
States, the Cherokee constitution of 1827 contained an unique provision which was designed to preserve tribal land by making it the common property of the Nation. "[lironically it was the very success of
the Cherokees in adopting a constitution.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

. .

which convinced the 'land

34.
41.
54.
52.
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hungry Georgians' of the necessity of Indian removal."8 The absorption into the Western Cherokee Nation of those Eastern Cherokees who
had managed to survive the Trail of Tears necessitated a revision of
the 1827 constitution. The revision was accomplished by the adoption
of the Cherokee constitution of 1839 which remained in effect for the
life of Cherokee government, and in the process survived both the
American Civil War and an internal Cherokee civil war.9 As a result
of the removal controversy with Georgia, preservation of tribal lands
became one of the principal goals of the Cherokees. To achieve that
goal, anyone who sold lands of the Cherokee Nation was declared to
be an outlaw.
In most instances, the transformation from tribal law ways to a
formal legal system was simply a question of adapting tribal values
worthy of preservation to those formal legal institutions of the white
man worthy of adoption. However, when the Cherokees decided to
enact inheritance laws at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they
could not rely on any Cherokee laws for guidance since tribal succession
laws were virtually nonexistent. After noting that "[tihe Cherokees
were thus free to select a pattern which would reinforce the tribal
goals,"10 Professor Strickland discusses this unique situation facing the
early nineteenth century reformers by analogizing as follows:
The Cherokees, like the later-day framers of the laws
for the newly created state of Israel, were making a new start
and could adopt a system which reflected "important political, cultural, social and economic" needs of the Nation. In
adopting the code for Israel three sources were considered:
Jewish law, foreign law, and the law in force in Israel. The
Cherokees "copied what suited them in the laws of the
whites, rejected what did not suit them, changed and modified and added to them until they obtained a system adapted
to their conditions.""
Before Sequoyah created a written Cherokee language all laws
had to be recorded in English. Professor Strickland assesses "Sequoyah's development of a usable syllabary [as] the most significant
single event in the history of the Cherokee people," 2 because its simplicity enabled all Cherokees to learn how to read and write. It was,
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 69.
/d.at 84.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 105.
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therefore, possible to publish Cherokee laws in the official tribal newspapers in English as well as Cherokee and to conduct a bilingual tribal
court system.
The early Cherokee courts' reliance on ancient customs in deciding cases which raised issues not adequately covered by Cherokee written
laws was supplanted during the post-American Civil War period by consideration of case law from other jurisdictions, by adhering to precedent and by reference to "standard works."
The end of Cherokee law administered by Cherokee courts came
in 1898. Congress had passed statutes establishing an United States
court in Indian Territory, restricting the jurisdiction of tribal courts and
finally abolishing all tribal courts after July 1, 1898. Thus, the white
land speculators' propaganda deriding the Cherokee society as lawless
and uncontrollable prevailed over the Cherokee assertion "that whatever lawlessness existed was essentially a product of white intruders."'1
Fire and the Spirits contains numerous accounts of bitter disappointments for the Cherokees caused by the white man's complete
disregard of Cherokee rights, especially when the latter conflicted with
the white man's interests. Ultimately, the Cherokees' hope that the
movement from clan to court would save their nation so that they could
govern themselves under their own laws remained unfulfilled. Despite
the somber outcome of the Cherokee struggle for autonomy, Professor
Strickland ends Fire and the Spirits on a positive note by maintaining
that the Cherokee spirit as embodied in their tribal law ways and
written law survives. "The Cherokee people, like their fire, seem to
have an eternal spirit."' 4
While Fire and the Spirits is largely an historical account of the
development of the Cherokee legal system, its significance lies in
Professor Strickland's demonstration that law is an expression of societal
goals and values. Stated differently, changes in the law are likely to
be reflective of changed societal goals and values. Thus, Fire and the
Spirits is to be recommended not only to the historically oriented reader
but to anyone enjoying an entertaining, easy-to-read, well-written book.
PeterBernhardt
13. Id. at 178.
14. Id. at 189.
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POLICE DISCRETION.

By Kenneth Culp Davis. St. Paul: West Publishing

Co. 1975. Pp. XII, 176. $4.50.

When a set of rules is promulgated by a regulatory body, they
combine to form an expression of that regulatory body's policy. However, another type of policy is formulated and expressed through the
enforcement procedure for the prescribed rules. Thus, one policy is
expressed in the published set of rules, based upon the presumption
that the rules will be enforced completely at all times, while another
policy is expressed through the actual degree of enforcement of the
rules.
In society a form of policy is expressed through the legislative
bodies by the establishment of municipal ordinances and state and federal statutes designating those activities which are criminal and prescribing the appropriate punishment. The original policy as expressed
by the legislature is altered and a new policy is expressed in the degree
of enforcement of these ordinances and statutes. Thus, where the
initial policy is made by the legislative bodies the subsequent policy is
made by the police departments ultimately responsible for enforcing
the laws.
The subject of Kenneth Culp Davis' new book is the making of
policy through selective enforcement. Davis brought to light for the
first time the extent of unnecessary discretionary power in selective
enforcement of laws in Discretionary Justice.' Davis' latest book,
Police Discretion, represents an expansion and thorough examination'
of the theories proposed in DiscretionaryJustice in relation to a study
of the Chicago Police Department.
On the basis of 300 interviews with Chicago police at all levels
(including the superintendent of police and the five deputy super1. When an enforcement agency or officer has discretionary power to do

nothing about a case in which enforcement would be clearly justified, the

result is a power of selective enforcement. Such power goes to selection of
parties against whom the law is enforced and selection of the occasions when
the law is enforced. Selective enforcement may also mean selection of the law
that will be enforced and of the law that will not be enforced; an officer may
enforce one statute fully, never enforce another, and pick and choose in enforcing a third.
K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 163 (1969).
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intendents), Davis found several pervasive factors in the application of
selective enforcement by the police department:
The central fact is that the police falsely pretend to enforce
all criminal law; the reason for the pretense is that they
believe the law requires them to enforce all criminal law but
they are unable to. The false pretense is pervasive and has
many consequences. Written instructions from top officers
(general orders, special orders, and training bulletins) provide for full enforcement, with slight exceptions. But all officers readily acknowledge that some law is never enforced and
that some is only sometimes enforced. The false pretense prevents open selective enforcement, prevents top officers from
making and announcing enforcement policy, prevents special
studies of enforcement policy, prevents the use of professional staffs for making enforcement policy, prevents enlistment of public participation in policymaking, and discourages
efforts of the police to coordinate their enforcement policy
with the policy of prosecutors and judges.'
Davis concludes that the system, consisting of the combination of
selective enforcement with a comprehensive pretense of full enforcement, is harmful and should be replaced by a system of open selective
enforcement. This conclusion is based on legal analysis with a final
determination that open selective enforcement is legal. Davis acknowledges that the full enforcement legislation (which states that the police
have an obligation to enforce all statutes and ordinances) is clear and
unambiguous. However, he finds "stronger legislative intent" favoring
selective enforcement elsewhere: including (1) a longterm legislative
reliance on police and prosecutors to selectively enforce criminal legislation acknowledged by the legislators as excessive, and (2) limited
appropriation of funds allowing for only an estimated one-half to twothirds full enforcement.
The analysis of "legislative intent" is the weakest part of Davis'
thesis. The full perspective of the function of municipalities and the
interrelationship between the police department and other departments
of the municipal government are never explored. Davis finds an intentional policy decision regarding full enforcement in the amount of
appropriation made to thei police department. Although ideally the
appropriation will reflect the wishes of the governing body regarding
the intended effectiveness of a program, in reality other factors influence the amount of an appropriation. Presently the dominant factor
2. K. DAvis, POLICE DIsCRETIoN H1-IV (1975)

(emphasis in original).
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is the economy-few local governments have the money which will
allow them to fund all departments to the desired level. There is a
difference between an intentional withholding of money from a program in order to maintain its activities at a certain level, and a low
appropriation due to other budgetary considerations. It is a difference
which should not be overlooked in an analysis seeking to establish the
legality of selective enforcement; however, this distinction is never discussed by Davis.
It is an inescapable fact that selective enforcement (whether legal
or illegal) does occur. In finding that it is legal, Davis presents a strong
argument for bringing selective enforcement into the open and confining and structuring it through rulemaking procedure analogous to the
federal administrative rulemaking procedure. Davis believes that if
the police do not voluntarily initiate an enforcement policy through a
system of rulemaking, the courts will require them to make rules. He
discusses one potential judicial technique for imposing that requirement.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held an
ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its vagueness
"permits and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law." [Papchristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972)]. The vagueness was in the ordinance.
What if the ordinance had been clear, but it was enforced
in only one-tenth of the cases to which its words apply, and
no one affected could know in advance which cases would
be chosen or on what basis? Could vagueness of an enforcement policy make it unconstitutional on the ground that it
"permits and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law"? I think the courts will and should
move gradually to an affirmative answer.'
Probably, the distinguishing point of Police Discretion is Davis' identification and analysis of the problem which frequently leads to the
necessity for selective enforcement-a legislative habit of writing overbroad criminal statutes. The community often expresses its ideals
through statutory prohibitions, relying on the police to insure compliance with community ideals. Thus, there could be an effective partial or full repeal of the statute through limited enforcement. However,
this type of repeal is concealed in an enforcement policy which could
bring back full enforcement of the statute at any moment as long as
the statute remains on the books. This is an excess which could be
3. Id. at 169.
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effectively halted through the application of Davis' theory. Courts
could easily prod legislatures to make necessary revision of the laws,
removing the need for some selective enforcement.
It is impossible to remove all selective enforcement from the
operation of the police department. Selective enforcement represents
the discretionary power that an officer needs to be effective. However,
Davis wishes to eliminate unnecessary discretionary power, by structuring and confining it in a rulemaking procedure. He advocates an
administrative alteration of criminal statutes and ordinances when the
appropriate legislative body has failed to make the necessary revisions
of the laws. When the issue is whether a statute should be enforced,
the problem speaks to the legislative function not the administrative
function. Davis has been extremely successful in diagnosing the
problem, but in the opinion of this reviewer he finds his solution in
the wrong arena.
Sandra J. Alexander

THE VICTIMS.

By Frank G. Carrington. New Rochelle, New York:

Arlington House. 1975. Pp. xxv, 326. $9.95.

"There is today in the [criminal justice] system a climate of
permissiveness that focuses entirely upon the perpetrators of criminal
acts. There is no corresponding concern for the victims of these acts." It
is with the above philosophy that author Frank Carrington sets the stage
in The Victims for a scathing attack on permissive, liberal and bleeding
heart radicals who promote the rights of the accused without a word of
concern for victims of crime.
Frank Carrington is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School and received his Masters of Laws degree in criminal law at
Northwestern University. He served as a criminal investigator for the
Marine Corps, as a Treasury agent, and as a legal advisor to the Denver
and Chicago police departments. The author is currently the Executive
Director of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE), a
nonprofit corporation whose aim is to provide responsible and effective
representation of the rights of the law-abiding.
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The author clearly and effectively presents the position of the lawand-order advocates. His unequivocal presentation leaves no doubt as to
his philosophy. The victims of crime have been all but forgotten by the
vocal blends who, in Mr. Carrington's view, have spawned a permissive
attitude toward the accused and convicted criminal. These liberals have
been supported by a trend of permissiveness in United States Supreme
Court decisions, often attributed to the Warren Court which promulgated Miranda on confessions and admissions, the exclusionary rule, and
the lineup cases.
In part I, Mr. Carrington establishes the general premise upon
which The Victims is founded. The premise is two-fold: (1) the rights
of actual and potential victims of crime have been largely ignored; and
(2) the rights of the victims can be expanded with a reduction in the
number and suffering of victims without a corresponding decrease in the
fundamental rights of the accused. The author further describes the
special victims who have suffered the brunt of permissiveness: the poor,
law enforcement and society.
The poor compose the largest group of victims as they live in the
crime infested slums and ghettos, and are more exposed to lawlessness
and violence. Police brutality is frequently claimed by ghetto dwellers.
However, according to the author, "there are far more instances of
criminals brutalizing the ghetto dwellers than there are policemen brutalizing them."
Law enforcement officials are special targets because of their jobs.
Yet they too are victims because of direct physical assaults and collateral
"targeting" attacks. These targeting attacks consist of judicial rulings
which expose police officers to increasing dangers, judges who impose
lenient sentences on convicted criminals, frivolous law suits, and other
forms of harrassment.
Society is a victim because of the economic cost of crime and the
psychological impact of each criminal act which represents a failure of
our criminal justice system.
Part II details the methods by which the criminal justice system
protects criminals to the detriment of the victim. The system in Mr.
Carrington's words has erected an "elaborate, thicket of contrived and
artificial protection around the criminal accused, but. . . is unable to
secure the right of noncriminals to go about their business in peace
. . .. " Among these artificial protections are the exclusionary rule, the
Mirandawarnings and the lineup cases.
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The exclusionary rule, a product of the Warren Court, has resulted
in suppression of the truth. The rule, according to the author, was to
"'police the police' " and prevent illegal searches and seizures. Mr.
Carrington attacks this purpose as spurious. The rule, he states, has
neither resulted in punishment of nor deterred offending officers. It has
resulted instead in suppression of the truth because of legal technicalities. In the author's opinion "the freeing of the patently guilty in order to
punish the police exacts an extremely high price from society and in
particular from the victims of crime."
The legal technicalities of Miranda v. Arizona' and the lengths to
which some courts have enforced them were other major contributors to
the climate of permissiveness and suppression of the truth. Miranda
frees confessors. Mirandacreated a totally new and artificial body of law
"having as its purpose the discouragement of the use of any criminal
confession and suppression of the truth contained in voluntary confessions."
The lineup cases have less impact today because of recent decisions
by the United States Supreme Court. Kirby v. Illinois2 returns the
standard for admissibility to a commonsense approach of fundamental

fairness and removes the rigidity and inflexibility of United States v.
Wade' and Gilbert v. California.4

The author further decries the unbalanced concern for criminals
which manifests itself in the collateral criminal proceedings such as bail,
corrections and parole. The questions of the right to bail and the amount
of bail are difficult problems. However, the criminal justice system has
favored the criminal against the interest of the victim. The right to bail is
almost absolute and many judges abuse the system by setting bail too
low for those accused of violent crime. Other crimes are frequently
committed by those out on bail. Court delays aid the criminal. The
corrections system is beset with such problems as reforms by amateur
"expert" penologists and high crime rates behind the walls. Convicted
felons whose offense consisted of a violent crime too frequently are
released on parole before their sentence has expired. Many have previous convictions and the recidivist rate is high. Those who make the
decison to release the felon without any real indication that he has
1.
2.
3.
4.

384
406
388
388

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

437
682
218
263

(1966).
(1972).
(1967).
(1967).
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reformed err on the side of leniency in the hope that the criminal will
not victimize again.
Finally, in part II, the author details the arguments for and against
capital punishment. He further describes the antivictim forces working
within the United States. Mr. Carrington strongly argues for the death
penalty. He claims that the public is in favor of reinstating the death
penalty after it was declared unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia.'
The antivictim forces are those (1) whose philosophy ignores the victim
by supporting a course of action which will benefit criminals, (2) who
release more criminally inclined individuals back to society so that they
may victimize again or (3) who make the jobs of law enforcement
officers more difficult. This force includes the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), proponents of civilian review boards for police departments, advocates of community control of police and those who file
harrassment-type law suits against police officers.
In part I, Mr. Carrington makes his own suggestions as to how to
restore the balance to the criminal system and aid victims. He advocates
recognition of the problem of victims and representation of victims in
various aspects of the system. He recommends the establishment of
victims' rights commissions and citizen action groups such as the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE). He suggests looking to
England for a model criminal system. To return to a search for the
truth, the author recommends elimination of the exclusionary rule and
modification of Miranda. He would restrict the grounds for delays of
proceedings, establish mandatory minimum sentences and stiffen bail
amounts or deny bail altogether for some criminal elements. Finally, he
suggests that protection, or at least vindication, of victims' rights may be
available through civil suits against criminals where the state may be
liable for the judgment.
Mr. Carrington presents a strong argument for a return to a lawand-order society. He attempts to support his position by listing abuses
which have resulted from lenient and permissive decisions. Some appeal
to emotion is made, but such appeals are kept to a minimum. The
author quotes noted authorities liberally throughout the book. The
greatest defects, in this reviewer's opinion, are a tendency to generalize
and a less than complete presentation of the reasoning supporting the
criticized court decisions. The generalization occurs in areas where little
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Contrary to the author's assertion, the Court merely
held that capital punishment was unconstitutional as discriminatorily administered under
state statutes which did not mandate its imposition for certain specified crimes.
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empirical data exists and a value judgment is called for. Mr. Carrington
forms his opinion on the side of the victim but criticizes others for using
generalizations to support their opposite conclusions. In addition, the
author summarily dismisses or makes light of arguments which run
contrary to his view. His own value judgments lead him to frame his
comments in a less than accurate manner in some instances. For example, his view of the criminal justice system in the United States as one
which raises a maze of legal technicalities solely designed to suppress the
truth belittles strong arguments backed by the United States Constitution which justify many of the "technicalities" he refutes.
In summary, The Victims gives an accurate picture of the counterpermissive view of the criminal justice system. Many of the problems in
our system today are fully and fairly discussed. Mr. Carrington presents
a legitimate argument for a position which is gaining momentum in
many segments of society. Regardless of one's own philosophical bent,
one must agree that Mr. Carrington has pinpointed many problems of
.the system and has described viable alternatives to these dilemmas.
L. W. Woodyard
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